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Abstract. Alabama, Florida, and Georgia have agreed on 
interstate compacts to resolve the water allocation disputes 
over the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) and Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) river basins. These compacts (one 
for each river basin) are examined by focusing on the legal 
implications of the agreements with special emphasis placed 
on: 
• General characteristics of interstate compacts; 
• Specific language from the ACT/ACF compacts; 
• Potential preemption of state and federal environmental 
regulations; and 
• Challenges with federal ratification. 
INTRODUCTION 
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia have finalized the terms of 
interstate compacts to allocate the water from the Alabama-
Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) and Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint (ACF) river basins. These interstate compacts promise 
to provide a negotiated solution to a lawsuit initially filed 
against the Army Corps of Engineers by Alabama and Florida 
demanding more water from the upstream state, Georgia. 
Alabama and Florida objected to what they believed was 
Georgia's ability to use all the water it required to serve its 
own citizens, without regard to downstream needs. 
The interstate compacts will utilize mathematical water 
allocation formulas for determining proper water flows. 
Although the compacts are in the process of being ratified, the 
water allocation formulas which represent the interests of each 
state and the other stakeholders must still be developed. 
The allocation formulas must balance the competing 
interests of the stakeholders in order to accomplish a long term 
solution to the water allocation problem and provide a 
permanent mechanism for managing these river basins. 
Interested parties include agriculture, environmental 
organizations, seafood industry, local governments, 
navigation, hydroelectric power, industry, federal government, 
and state agencies 
As these parties reach a final compromise for regulating 
these rivers, the need for understanding the legal issues 
concerning these interstate agreements become more 
important. All parties must recognize how these compacts  
impact existing state and federal regulations as well as the 
implications these agreements have on unplanned 
contingencies. 
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
An interstate compact is an agreement between two or more 
states that attempts to solve a problem which transcends state 
lines. Once validly enacted, an interstate compact binds states 
to the terns of the agreement both under state and federal law. 
Similar to a contract between private parties, an interstate 
compact cannot be amended or repealed by unilateral action of 
the member states unless the express terms of the compact for 
amendment are followed. 
The Constitution grants states the power to enter into 
interstate compacts by its language "no state shall, without the 
consent of Congress .. enter into any agreement or compact 
with an other state or with a foreign power." An interstate 
compact is created when states negotiate and reach a final 
agreement where the parties wish to be bound to the 
compromise reached. 
The interstate compact process has proceeded in three 
phases: negotiation, state ratification, and federal ratification. 
Currently, the negotiation phase has ended and states are 
ratifying the agreements in their respective legislatures. 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
With the ACF/ACT comprehensive water allocation study, 
governors of each state appointed representatives from the 
competing stakeholder interest groups to an advisory council 
which studied the competing state needs and reconciled these 
needs with the natural flows of the river basins. An 
independent consultant was retained by the commission to 
compile the results reached during the commission meetings 
and to recommend future directions for the negotiations. 
The compacts were developed by the study team using 
questionnaires and surveys for identifying the concerns and 
issues important to the competing interests. The survey results 
were compiled and analyzed using a computer model which 
calculated the impact of different water allocations on the 
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identified areas of concern. The compacts resulting from this 
negotiation set the general parameters and give broad 
discretion to the administrative body overseeing the compact. 
The compact language which is almost identical for both 
compacts is examined below. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACF/ACT COMPACTS 
Coordination Mechanism 
Currently, both interstate compacts create a "Basin 
Conunission" as a long term coordination mechanism 
responsible for making decisions in accordance with the 
agreement. This commission contains representatives from 
each state appointed by that state's governor. A federal 
representative also serves on the commission and is nominated 
by the President of the United States. 
The federal representative does not have a vote on 
commission decisions. Instead, a unanimous vote of the three 
state commissioners is required in all decisions. 
The Commission is vested with the following powers: 
• to adopt bylaws and procedures governing conduct; 
• to staff positions necessary to accomplish the goals of the 
compacts; 
• to receive and spend funds from lawful sources; 
• to enter into agreements and contracts to further the goals 
of the compacts; 
• to plan, coordinate, monitor, and study problems related to 
floods, droughts, water quality, water supply, and 
conservation; and 
• to establish and modify an allocation formula apportioning 
water quantity. 
Although these duties are general and give the commission 
flexibility to handle upcoming problems, its lack of specificity 
makes it difficult to predict how the coordination mechanism 
will handle future problems. 
Flexibility 
The tri-state compacts try to reach a balance between the 
level of certainty necessary to ensure enforcement and 
compliance of the agreements and the flexibility needed to 
handled future contingencies. Because the compacts will be 
both federal and state law after ratification by Congress and 
the state legislatures, the states will not be able to unilaterally 
change the tenns of the agreements. This makes the broad 
language of the compact in the areas of water quality and 
regulatory impacts more influential. 
Even though the current contract negotiations are 
concentrating on water quantity, these compacts will not 
adequately handle the tri-state problems without considering 
water quality because the issues of water quantity and quality 
are so intertwined. It is also not clear how this new 
commission will interact with existing water management 
agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers, state  
environmental protection divisions, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
The role of those currently utilizing the water in these 
river basins is also not certain. Reservoirs, hydroelectric 
power, navigation, and natural processes all have future needs 
which are difficult to predict. The technological methods and 
computer models used to simulate their water allocation 
impacts must be agreed upon so that an objective method of 
evaluating the agreement is present. Integrating each of the 
stakeholders into this process makes the agreement more likely 
to adequately handle future contingencies. 
Water Allocation Mechanism 
Even though the commission has agreed upon general 
water quantity goals, the commission must still formulate an 
equation for updating the water flows for future years which 
will accommodate the changing needs of the parties utilizing 
water from these river basins. This formula must be agreed 
upon unanimously by the members of River Basin 
Commissions. The compact language states that the water 
allocation formula should protect "water quality, ecology, and 
biodiversity," but this language does not bind the 
Commissioners to a particular allocation strategy. 
Termination Provisions 
The ACF/ACT compacts expressly indicate methods for 
withdrawing from the compact. These methods include: 
• Legislatures of all three states repeal the compact through 
general laws enacted within three consecutive years. 
• United States Congress expressly repeals the compact. 
• The states fail to agree on a water allocation standard by 
December 31, 1998 (unless the Basin Commission 
unanimously agrees on a time extension). 
• The Federal Commissioner submits an official letter of 
nonconcturence about the allocation formula, and the State 
Commissioners are unable to renegotiate a suitable 
compromise with the Federal Commissioner 
REGULATORY PREEMPTION 
Preemption of Federal Environmental Regulation 
An area of potential concern with interstate compacts and 
their status as binding federal law involves preemption of 
previously enacted federal legislation. The following federal 
statutes are of special concern: 
• The Clean Water Act; 
• The Endangered Species Act; 
• The National Environmental Policy Act; and 
• The Rivers and Harbors Act. 
If these statutes are in conflict with the terms of the 
interstate compacts, the courts may assume that Congress 
understood the potential conflicts with existing legislation 
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when the compact was adopted and meant for the new 
agreement to prevail. 
Although the compacts expressly state their intention to 
comply with this federal legislation, no specific mention is 
made of how to handle conflicts between the compacts and 
federal laws. In fact, in broad language, the compacts state 
that "other state and federal laws affecting the basin shall, to 
the maximum extent practicable, enforce, implement or 
administer those laws in furtherance of the purposes of the 
compact." This language does not address what happens when 
compliance with federal law is not "practicable" given a rigid 
allocation formula. 
Most current interstate compacts were signed in the 1940s, 
before the comprehensive environmental protection acts were 
promulgated, so courts have had few opportunities for 
examining the impact of interstate compacts enacted after these 
statutes. Water quantity allocation schemes could result in 
violation of federal environmental protection statutes in order 
to achieve the quantities required under the compacts. Since 
water quantity and economic interests represent the dominant 
interests of the compact drafters' interests, it remains unclear 
how the compacts may impact environmental quality issues. 
Issues of conflict and preemption may be difficult to resolve 
because conflict is measured by the scope and area of 
operation of the relevant statutes. Because potential conflicts 
are fact-based and often involve contingencies which were not 
considered when the compacts were drafted, conflict and the 
scope of the provisions are often difficult to determine. 
Whenever possible, the courts will seek to find an 
interpretation where both state and compact can coexist, but if 
conflict is inevitable, the terms of the interstate contract will 
control. 
Parties involved with drafting the ACT/ACF allocation 
formulas must keep these potential impacts in mind so that the 
tri-state agreements do not unduly jeopardize environmental 
protection of the river basins in order to accommodate diverse 
water quantity needs. 
Limits on State Sovereignty 
Once the agreement is ratified, the compacting states will be 
restrained from acting in manner that might interfere with the 
compact terms. This means that state legislatures and agencies 
are bound by the water allocation scheme as stated in the 
ACT/ACF compact and future state legislative or agency 
actions cannot jeopardize state compliance with the interstate 
compacts without violating federal law. 
Also, prior state statutes which conflict with the terms of 
the agreement will be preempted by the compact's 
requirements. This could create problems with previous 
legislative schemes for environmental protection and citizen 
water rights as discussed above with federal legislative 
preemption. 
Even though the language of the ACT/ACF agreements 
states that the "compact shall not interfere with the right or 
power of any state to regulate the uses and control of water  
within the boundaries of the state," this right is limited by the 
allocation formula. This restraint could be devastating 
depending on the types of unplanned events occurring and the 




The states' respective legislative bodies must ratify the 
compact. The document enacted by each state should be 
identical to that ratified by the federal government and the 
other state legislatures to prevent any confusion about the 
terms of the agreement. State legislative enactment of the 
compact allows states to enforce the compact against 
individual state citizens even if those citizens did not 
participate in the agreement's negotiation. 
Federal Ratification 
Once the state legislatures approve the compacts, the federal 
government should approve the final compacts. Most 
interstate compacts experience few problems with 
congressional ratification because the federal government 
encourages compromise and negotiation to solve the complex 
problems and differing interests inherent in water resource 
allocation., however the federal government may object to the 
limited role of the Federal Commissioner in the Basin 
Commission. This limited role only gives the federal officer 
power to veto water allocation formulas and voice concerns 
about all other issues - no vote on other Commission 
decisions. 
Another potential hurdle for the ACT/ACF compacts comes 
from the fact that few interstate compacts have been signed 
since the enactment of comprehensive federal environmental 
legislation. The uncertainty and potential problems of the 
interstate compact preempting federal legislation may cause 
Congress to more closely scrutinize the tri-state compact than 
previous compacts which were easily enacted. 
Once the compact is ratified by Congress, the agreement 
becomes a federal law binding the states to its terms. Because 
the compact has become federal law, states and individual 
citizens can bring actions in federal court to enforce the 
agreement. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires 
states to obey federally enacted law. This binds states to the 
compacts' agreed upon terms unless the terms allow states to 
withdraw under certain circumstances or if Congress gives 
approval for a compact's dissolution. 
Congressional scrutiny before the agreement's enactment 
allows the federal government to ensure that non-compacting 
states are not prejudiced by the agreement. Federal ratification 
is also needed so that the federal government will not interfere 
with the interstate agreement outside the formal mechanisms 
for federal intrusion the agreements create. 
Federal ratification also protects interstate compacts from 
Commerce Clause challenges. The Commerce Clause 
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recognizes that the Constitution has reserved the power for 
regulating interstate commerce with the federal government. 
The negative implication from this power may invalidate state 
efforts which seek to regulate interstate commerce. If the 
federal government exercises its grant of power to regulate 
interstate commerce by enacting the interstate compacts, no 
state intrusion into federal power will occur, and the interstate 
compact will sustain any Commerce Clause challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
The ACF/ACT river basin compacts have been ratified by 
the Georgia Assembly, but the real issues concerning water 
allocation have yet to be decided. Because of the broad 
language used in adopting the parameters of the compact itself, 
the state Basin Commissioners and public participants must 
actively scrutinize the proposed water allocation formulas. If 
not designed properly, these formulas have the potential of 
binding states to water allocation levels that would threaten 
federal and state environmental regulation. 
Moreover, the compacting states should have the agreement 
ratified by Congress to insure that the agreements survive 
constitutional scrutiny and secure federal governmental 
cooperation. This federal ratification may prove difficult 
because of the limited federal role in the coordination 
mechanism as well as the uncertain interaction between the 
compact and environmental regulation. 
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